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INDIVIDUAL-BASED, CROSS-BORDER LITIGATION:  
A NATIONAL SECURITY PRACTITIONER’S PERSPECTIVE 
DANIEL A. RESTREPO* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Even a cursory review of the past four years reveals seemingly 
limitless potential challenges facing national security practitioners, 
including violent extremists, transnational criminals, hackers, 
rogue states, pandemics, earthquakes, tsunamis, super storms, and 
economic and financial meltdowns. 
Less visible, but no less real, is another group that regularly 
affects the national security policy process:  individual litigants. 
Although by no means a new phenomenon,1 individual-based, 
cross-border litigation—be it inside or outside U.S. courts—is a fact 
of life that affects the national security policy process.  For 
example, during my more than three years leading the Western 
Hemisphere policy process on the National Security Staff at the 
White House, cases—or potential cases—affected the policy 
making context touching on U.S. relations with Argentina, Brazil, 
Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Mexico, to 
name only a small sample. 
 
*  Daniel A. Restrepo is the founder and Managing Director of Restrepo 
Strategies LLC, an international strategic consulting firm.  Restrepo served as 
President Barack Obama’s primary advisor on the Western Hemisphere for six 
years, including more than three years as Special Assistant to the President and 
Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs on the National Security Staff at 
the White House.  Restrepo also served as an advisor to the 2008 and 2012 Obama 
for America presidential campaigns. The views reflected in this note are the 
author’s alone.  
1 The Jay and Marshall Courts, for example, handled plenty of litigation 
involving foreign affairs from the earliest days of our republic.  See Ariel N. 
Lavinbuk, Note, Rethinking Early Judicial Involvement in Foreign Affairs: An 
Empirical Study of the Supreme Court’s Docket, 114 YALE L.J. 855, 867–86 (2005) 
(attempting to understand the judicial role in foreign policy by analyzing the 
foreign affairs dockets of the Jay and Marshall Courts).  
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2. INDIVIDUAL LITIGANTS, SYSTEMIC EFFECTS 
Four brief case studies help demonstrate how individual-based 
litigation affects the U.S. national security policy-making process.  
The four cases are: 
1. The touchstone for this Symposium—the Lago Agrio 
litigation in Ecuador; 
2. Litigation stemming from Argentina’s December 2001 
sovereign debt default;2 
3. Doe v. Zedillo,3 an Alien Tort Claims Act case against 
former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo; and 
4. Martinez v. Cuba,4 an attachment proceeding in U.S. 
Federal District Court stemming from a Florida state 
court default judgment.  
2.1. Chevron & Lago Agrio 
The implications of environmental, mass-tort litigation in 
Ecuador involving Chevron long-ago spilled into the policy-
making context as litigants and the Government of Ecuador have 
extensively lobbied the U.S. Executive and Congress regarding the 
litigation’s potential implications for U.S. policy toward Ecuador. 
Chevron and its backers, for example, have frequently 
petitioned the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and 
others in the Executive Branch, as well as members of Congress’s 
key trade committees—the Senate Committee on Finance and the 
 
2 For background on the default and resulting U.S.-based litigation, see 
generally EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding 
that funds belonging to the Argentina’s central bank held in the Federal Reserve 
Bank are not an attachable interest of the Republic of Argentina).  See also Lucy 
Reed, Scorecard of Investment Treaty Cases Against Argentina Since 2001, KLUWER 
ARB. BLOG (Mar. 2, 2009), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009 
/03/02/scorecard-of-investment-treaty-cases-against-argentina-since-2001/ 
(listing international arbitration cases arising from the 2001 default). 
3 Complaint, Doe v. Zedillo, No. 3:11-cv-01433-AWT (D. Conn. Sept. 16, 
2011), available at http://acteal97.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/complaint_ 
cover_sheet.pdf. 
4 Order Granting Summary Judgment and Dissolving Writs of Garnishment, 
Martinez v. Republic of Cuba, 708 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (No. 10-cv-
22095-FAM) available at http://www.exportlawblog.com/docs/martinez_v_ 
cuba.pdf (granting Garnishees’ Motion for Dissolution of Writs of Garnishment, 
Summary Judgment, and Attorneys’ Fees as well as Government’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment and to quash Plaintiff’s Writs of Garnishment). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss4/2
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House of Representatives Committee on Ways & Means—to 
eliminate Ecuador’s benefits under the Andean Trade Promotion 
and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA).5 
Based in part on ATPDEA, the United States is Ecuador’s 
largest trade partner.6  The argument has been made that such 
preferential access to the world’s largest market should not be 
provided to a country that has subjected a U.S. company to the 
treatment that Chevron contends it has faced in Ecuador.  Even 
though the bilateral relationship encompasses issues well beyond a 
dispute between private litigants,7 Chevron’s concerns regarding 
the Lago Agrio litigation have colored ATPDEA discussions in 
Washington and almost certainly will again when the issue comes 
up for consideration in 2013. 
The impact of Lago Agrio on the policy-making context 
highlights one of the inherent difficulties that come with litigation 
and its effects.  It is common, for example, for officials from other 
countries to complain about U.S. judicial processes and request 
that the U.S. Executive Branch weigh in on pending litigation.  As a 
White House staffer, one of the first things you learn is the clear 
policy of non-intervention in pending judicial processes.  The well-
founded independence of our judiciary is emphasized until foreign 
government counterparts move on to a new topic. 
Other countries have also learned to invoke “judicial 
independence”—well-founded or otherwise—to U.S. policy-
makers who complain about judicial processes in their countries.  
 
5 Under ATPDEA, a broad class of Ecuadoran products—most importantly 
fresh-cut flowers—enjoys duty-free access to the United States in exchange for 
Ecuador’s cooperation regarding counter-narcotics efforts.  Andean Trade 
Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 3101, 116 Stat. 1023 
(2002). 
6 See Bureau of W. Hemisphere Affairs, Fact Sheet: U.S. Relations with Ecuador, 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Oct. 24 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35761. 
htm (explaining the economic relationship between the U.S. and Ecuador). 
7 The U.S.-Ecuador relationship has been complicated by actions taken by the 
Ecuadorian government in recent years, including the expulsion of the U.S. 
ambassador in the wake of WikiLeaks and the prior expulsion of other senior 
embassy personnel.  See Associated Press, Ecuador: U.S. Ambassador Expelled over 
WikiLeaks, CBSNEWS.COM (Apr. 5, 2011, 3:20 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
2100-202_162-20050944.html (reporting that Ecuador expelled the U.S. 
ambassador, making her the third U.S. diplomat to be kicked out of the country 
since 2008, because she allegedly accused Ecuador’s police chief of corruption in a 
cable). 
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Being seen as passing judgment on the veracity or integrity of a 
foreign judicial process is a tricky business, at best, and 
underscores the dilemma posed by cases like Lago Agrio that 
revolve in no small measure around questions regarding the basic 
fairness of judicial processes in a foreign country. 
2.2.  Argentine Debt Litigation 
In December 2001, the Government of Argentina defaulted on 
$100 billion in sovereign debt, triggering a mass of litigation, the 
implications of which have spilled into the policy-making context 
through two distinct channels. 
The first is through actions brought by corporations whose 
dollar-denominated contracts were severely impaired when the 
Argentine government unilaterally determined that it would 
instead make its payments in devalued Argentine pesos.  In 
response, numerous U.S. companies sought relief before the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID).  Multiple ICSID panels issued judgments in favor of U.S. 
companies, but the Argentine government subsequently decided 
that the judgments were not self-executing and needed to be 
brought to an Argentine court for enforcement.8  
When ICSID judgment holders balked and the Argentine 
government refused to pay, their dispute spilled into the broader 
U.S.-Argentina policy-making context as the aggrieved U.S. 
companies petitioned USTR to revoke Argentina’s eligibility for 
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).9 
In October 2011, when President Obama met Argentina’s 
President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner on the margins of the G-
20 Summit in France, ICSID and GSP were on the top of their 
agenda.10  They would again be high on the agenda when the two 
Presidents met in April 2012 on the margins of the Summit of the 
 
8 See U.S. Dep’t of State, GSP Fact Sheet, U.S. EMBASSY: BUENOS AIRES 
http://argentina.usembassy.gov/gsp2.html (last vistied May 7. 2013) (explaining 
why Argentina’s GSP benefits have been suspended). 
9 See id. 
10 See US: Obama-CFK Meeting ‘Warm,’ But Argentina Must Cancel Debt, 
BUENOS AIRES HERALD, Nov. 9, 2011, http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/ 
84136/us-obamacfk-meeting-warm-but-argentina-must-cancel-debt (explaining 
that, while in Cannes, Fernández de Kirchner and Obama discussed bilateral 
relations and Argentina’s debt restructuring with the Paris Club). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss4/2
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Americas in Colombia.11  The end result:  Argentina continues to 
refuse to pay the ICSID judgments, Argentine products no longer 
enjoy preferential access to the United States after President 
Obama revoked GSP for Argentina,12 and the two leaders spent a 
disproportionate amount of scarce meeting time discussing narrow 
commercial disputes.  
The second way in which litigation has affected the 
relationship between the two countries—that could otherwise 
focus on a myriad of hemispheric and global issues—is through 
litigation brought by bondholders, particularly bondholders that 
have rejected two different Argentine settlements with other 
bondholders. 
The hold-out bondholders have pursued an aggressive 
litigation strategy and made their views and displeasure regarding 
the Argentine government well known to Executive Branch and 
Congressional policy makers.13  Although the bondholders were 
not formally part of the ICSID-GSP saga, their efforts clearly 
affected the policy-making environment.  
In late 2012, the far-flung effects of Argentine bondholder 
litigation took a turn toward magical realism when the Argentine 
tall ship the ARA Libertad, a large ceremonial sailboat owned and 
operated by the Argentine Navy, was seized in accordance with a 
local court order by Ghanaian authorities when it made a port of 
call during a training tour.14  Behind the court order stood 
bondholders seeking to enforce judgments to pay outstanding 
 
11 See CFK and Obama Agree to Solve Trade Differences, BUENOS AIRES HERALD, 
Apr. 15, 2012, http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/98164/cfk-and-
obama-agree-to-solve-trade-differences (indicating that Obama requested the 
meeting in advance of the summit while Argentina was “facing questions from 
industrialized nations about trade barriers . . . .”). 
12 See U.S. EMBASSY, supra note 8 (“The United States is thus statutorily 
required to revoke Argentina’s GSP benefits.”). 
13 The most prominent effort has been undertaken by the American Task 
Force Argentina.  See generally About Us, AM. TASK FORCE ARGENTINA: PURSUING A 
FAIR RECONCILIATION OF THE ARGENTINE DEBT DEFAULT, http://www.atfa.org/ 
about-us/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2013) (communicating AFTA’s mission and 
methods for achieving a negotiated settlement of the Argentine debt default). 
14 See Daniel Politi, Liberty or Debt, a post in Latitude: Views From Around The 
World, THE INT’L HERALD TRIB. GLOBAL OPINION (Oct. 17, 2012, 6:37 AM), 
http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/17/holders-of-argentinas-defaulted-
debt-hold-up-a-frigate-in-ghana (recounting the taking of the ARA Libertad, an 
Argentine training frigate, as due payment for Argentina’s debt default). 
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obligations against the Argentine government,15 underscoring the 
far-reaching effects of individual-based, cross-broader litigation in 
a shrinking world.16 
2.3.  Doe vs. Zedillo 
Individual-based, cross-border litigation in U.S. courts—just 
like cases filed abroad—can also affect the U.S. policy-making 
process. 
Doe v. Zedillo—a suit filed in U.S. District Court in Connecticut 
in September 2011 against a former President of Mexico, Ernesto 
Zedillo, who now works at Yale and thus lives in Connecticut— is 
an example of such litigation, and its effects.  The complaint seeks 
$50 million in damages for alleged violations of the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, the Torture Victims Claims Act, customary 
international law, and various international human rights 
conventions for the actions taken by Mexican security forces in 
Acteal, Chiapas, Mexico, on December 22, 1997, when Zedillo was 
President of Mexico.17  
 Alien Tort Claims Act litigation is not new,18 nor is its 
interaction with, and effects on, U.S. international relations.19  
During the course of decades, plaintiffs have brought cases in U.S. 
courts that have implicated governments around the world, 
 
15 See id. (Investment firm NML Capital petitioned the Ghanaian judge to 
prohibit the ship from leaving port).  
16 As it continues in the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York, the underlying bondholder litigation has raised the specter of 
another Argentine debt default, and spawned a dispute as to whether rulings in 
that case endanger the New York Federal Reserve Bank’s $2.6 trillion payments 
system.  See Agustino Fontevecchia, Billionaire’s Hedge Fund Rebuffs NY Fed in 
Argentina Case:  No Risk to $2.6T Payments System, FORBES.COM  (Nov. 26, 2012, 8:40 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2012/11/26/billionaires-
hedge-fund-rebuffs-ny-fed-in-argentina-case-no-risk-to-2-6t-payments-system 
(describing the potential implications of litigation “[p]itting a hedge fund against 
a nation”). 
17  Complaint at 1, 8, Doe v. Zedillo, No. 3:11-cv-01433-AWT (D. Conn. Sept. 
16, 2011), available at http://acteal97.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/ 
complaint_cover_sheet.pdf.  
18 See Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789:  
A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 461, 461–62 (1989) (citing federal district court 
actions brought as early as 1980 under the Alien Tort Claims Act). 
19 See generally id. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss4/2
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touching on relations with governments that were friends and foes 
of the United States.20 
There is no country in the world more important to the United 
States today than Mexico, and there is perhaps no country in the 
world with whom we have a more complex relationship given our 
shared history and geography.  Mexico is the third largest U.S. 
trading partner21 and the second largest destination for U.S. 
exports, with more than $1 billion in trade, on average, crossing the 
shared border every day.22  It is our second largest source of 
imported oil.23  We have deep cultural, familial, and historical ties 
to Mexico—the country of origin for the largest segment of foreign-
born individuals in the United States.24  Transnational criminal 
organizations traffic in people, drugs, guns, and money across our 
shared border with devastating consequences for communities in 
both countries. 
The intensity of the bilateral relationship is evident in the fact 
that, in my more than three years as the President’s principal 
White House advisor on the Western Hemisphere, the maximum 
number of times I visited any particular country in my area of 
responsibility other than Mexico was four; I visited Mexico 
seventeen times. 
Despite the depth and breadth of the relationship, in 2011 and 
2012, the 1997 Acteal massacre became a focal point of U.S.-Mexico 
relations.  The government of out-going Mexican President Felipe 
 
20 See id. at 461–64 (explaining that foreign citizens have employed the Alien 
Tort Claims Act as a vehicle for suing inter alia the U.S.-backed Nicaraguan 
“contras,” the Palestinian Liberation  Organization, and an Argentine military 
general). 
21 See Top Trading Partners – Total Trade, Exports, Imports: Year-to-Date 
November 2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.census.gov/ 
foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1211yr.html (serving as a source of 
data about United States trade and the economy). 
22 Id. 
23 See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Petroleum & Other Liquids: U.S. Imports by 
Country of Origin, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/ 
dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_a.htm (listing U.S. import 
of petroleum and other liquids in annual-thousand barrels by country of origin).  
24 See Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012, Table 42. Foreign-Born 
Population by Citizenship Status and Place of Birth: 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2012), 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0042.pdf (reporting 
the number of foreign-born individuals in the United States by place of birth and 
citizenship status as recorded in 2009).  
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Calderón urged the United States to support former President 
Zedillo’s head of state immunity claim in Doe v. Zedillo25 and not 
without some personal concern regarding cross-border litigation. 
During his tenure, President Calderón, who also moved to the 
United States upon leaving office, intensified the Mexican 
government’s efforts against transnational criminal organizations, 
sparking abuses claims from human rights organizations26 and 
touching off attempts to initiate cross-border legal proceedings.  In 
November 2011, for example, Mexican human rights activists filed 
a war crimes complaint in the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
against Calderón and Mexico’s top drug trafficker, Joaquín 
“Chapo” Guzmán, raising the specter that individual-based, cross-
border litigation would follow Calderón from office.27 
In September 2012, upon petition of the court, the U.S. 
government filed a brief, consistent with past practice, supporting 
Zedillo’s immunity defense.  Doe v. Zedillo remains pending before 
the District Court, and the ICC has yet to determine the disposition 
of the initial complaint against Calderón.  Nevertheless, these cases 
demonstrate how litigation triggered by individuals can have a 
direct impact, at least in the context of U.S. relations, at the highest 
levels with our most important global partners. 
 
25 See Randal C. Archibold, U.S. Moves to Grant Former Mexican President 
Immunity in Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09 
/09/world/americas/us-moves-to-grant-former-mexican-president-immunity-in-
suit.html (recounting a statement by the U.S. government recommending that the 
federal court dismiss the suit against Zedillo on head of state immunity grounds); 
Daniel Ozawa Sussman, Mexico: Calderón Administration Demanded Immunity for 
Ex-President, PULSAMERICA (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.pulsamerica.co.uk/2012 
/09/17/mexico-calderon-administration-demanded-immunity-for-ex-president-
zedillo/ (relating that the Mexican ambassador warned the U.S. government of 
the potential diplomatic consequences stemming from the lawsuit against 
Zedillo). 
26 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NEITHER RIGHTS NOR SECURITY: 
KILLINGS, TORTURE, AND DISAPPEARANCES IN MEXICO’S “WAR ON DRUGS” (2011). 
27 See Sara Webb & Manuel Rueda, Mexican Group Asks ICC to Probe President, 
Officials, REUTERS (Nov. 25, 2011, 10:05 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2011/11/26/us-mexico-icc-idUSTRE7AO0TA20111126 (reporting on a request by 
Mexican human rights activists that the ICC investigate President Calderón’s 
supposed responsibility for drug-related violence in Mexico); Diana Castrillòn, 
Mexico Presidency Threatens Legal Action over ICC Complaint, AGENCE FRANCE 
PRESSE, Nov. 28, 2011, http://www.ntn24.com/news/news/mexico-presidency-
threatens-legal-action-over-icc-complaint (describing backlash by the Mexican 
presidency in response to the ICC complaint). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss4/2
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2.4.  Martinez v. Cuba 
The intersection of individual-based litigation and U.S. foreign 
policy is also evident in the thicket of statutory and administrative 
rules and regulations and related litigation that has accumulated 
over the course of the last fifty years of U.S. policy toward Cuba.28 
These statutes include, perhaps, the most direct attempt to use 
individual-based litigation as a tool of U.S. policy—the Cuban 
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996,29 which, among 
other things, established an individual right of action in U.S. 
District Court for those who had property confiscated by Cuban 
authorities after the Cuban Revolution and who subsequently 
became U.S. citizens.30  This unprecedented expansion of U.S. 
jurisdiction, which was meant to freeze efforts by Cuba to attract 
direct foreign investment, has never come into force. It included a 
national security waiver by which every six months the President 
of the United States can toll its entry into force.  Thus far, three 
Presidents have exercised this waiver, thirty-one times in total.31 
That, however, does not mean the U.S.-Cuba policy thicket is 
not affected by individual-based litigation in the United States.  It 
most certainly is. 
Cases brought in Florida state courts alleging human rights 
violations by Cuban authorities represent the principal 
manifestation of this phenomenon.  As Cuba has regularly refused 
to appear, let alone defend itself, in these cases, a series of 
significant default judgments have accumulated against the Cuban 
 
28 See generally DIANNE E. RENNACK & MARK P. SULLIVAN, U.S.-CUBAN 
RELATIONS:  AN ANALYTIC COMPENDIUM OF U.S. POLICIES, LAWS & REGULATIONS 
(2005), available at http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/2005-03-U.S.-
Cuban_Relations.pdf (”This compendium presents the texts of the U.S. policy 
statements, laws and regulations . . . that govern U.S. relations with Cuba.”).  
29 22 U.S.C. Ch. 69A (2012). 
30 22 U.S.C. § 6082 (2012). 
31 See Stephen F. Propst, Presidential Authority To Modify Economic 
Sanctions Against Cuba 7 (Feb. 15, 2011) (unpublished forum paper), available at 
http://www.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/57d34e80-51b8-4ee0-ae64-
750f65ee7642/Preview/PublicationAttachment/55896b90-840a-42bf-8744-
752a7a206333/Cuba%20Aritcle%20FINAL.pdf (citing 22 U.S.C. § 6085(c)) 
(reviewing the sources of the President’s authority to ease U.S. sanctions against 
Cuba).  
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government.32  Those judgments will add to the policy puzzle 
when relations between the United States and Cuba change as 
holders of those judgments are today U.S. citizens and, like 
aggrieved former property holders in Cuba, are likely to petition 
U.S. authorities to champion their interests.  But those judgments 
do not only promise to affect the future policy-making context; 
they have real effects today and in 2011 threatened to undo 
President Obama’s signature policy initiative related to Cuba. 
In April 2009, President Obama eliminated all restrictions on 
Cuban-American family visits and remittances to Cuba.33  In the 
year that followed, more than 300,000 Cuban Americans—a record 
number—visited Cuba.34  Such family travel relies on licensed air 
charters as there has not been regularly scheduled commercial air 
traffic between the United States and Cuba since 1962. 
In 2010, a Florida plaintiff seeking to enforce a default 
judgment almost brought these charters to a halt.  After securing a 
$27.2 million default judgment against Cuba, Ana Margarita 
Martinez sought to collect the judgment by attaching the landing 
fees U.S. air charter companies pay to Cuba.  If the payment of 
those fees had stopped, so too would have the President’s policy 
initiative to increase the free flow of information to, from, and 
among the Cuban people and decrease the dependence of the 
Cuban people on the Cuban state. 
The Martinez attachment litigation quickly found itself front 
and center among policymakers in Washington.  To preserve the 
U.S. national security interests at the heart of the President’s policy 
initiative, the United States intervened in the litigation, 
 
32 See Debra Cassens Weiss, Cuban Exile Awarded $2.8B in Suit Against Castro 
Government, A.B.A. J., Aug. 25, 2011, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ 
cuban_exile_awarded_2.8b_in_suit_against_castro_government/ (announcing a 
large judgment against Cuba for an exiled individual who claimed persecution 
and noting that because Cuba does not defend itself in alike lawsuits, judgments 
against it have become “’almost automatic’”). 
33 See Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Reaching Out to the Cuban 
People (Apr. 13, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ 
Fact-Sheet-Reaching-out-to-the-Cuban-people (summarizing President Obama’s 
orders to cabinet members which were intended to “facilitate . . . contact between 
separated family members in the United States and Cuba and increase the flow of 
information and humanitarian resources directly to the Cuban people”). 
34 Lizette Alvarez, Pull of Family Reshapes U.S.-Cuban Relations, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/22/us/cuban-americans-take-
lead-in-building-ties-with-cuba.html?pagewanted=all. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss4/2
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successfully arguing that the plaintiff failed to comply with key 
aspects of the regulatory thicket underlying U.S. policy toward 
Cuba.35  The charters continue. 
CONCLUSION 
These four very different case studies highlight how a single 
litigant, or group of litigants, can affect, either unintentionally or 
purposefully, key U.S. foreign policy interests and relationships, 
and how such result can happen without the litigant ever seeking 
to make the United States a formal party to such litigation. 
Just like a myriad of other man-made (and naturally occurring) 
challenges, individual-based, cross-border litigation is a reality of 
which every national security practitioner must be aware and 
prepared to address head on.  
 
 
 
35 See Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 13–14, Martinez 
v. Republic of Cuba, 708 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (No. 10-cv-20611-FAM), 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/194063.pdf 
(asserting that plaintiff could not satisfy her judgment as she neglected to obtain 
applicable license required by U.S. regulations and no statute overrides such 
regulations). 
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